

**CONTRA COSTA COUNTY
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS COMMISSION
PLANNING AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE MEETING**

**Wednesday, October 16, 2019
4:00 p.m. – 5:30 p.m.**

**1333 Pine Street
Suite C-1
Martinez CA 94553**

The Contra Costa County Hazardous Materials Commission will provide reasonable accommodations for persons with disabilities planning to attend the Hazardous Materials Commission meetings who contact Michael Kent, Hazardous Materials Commission Executive Assistant, at least 24 hours before the meetings, at (925) 313-6587

AGENDA

- 1. CALL TO ORDER, ANNOUNCEMENTS AND INTRODUCTIONS**
- 2. APPROVAL OF MINUTES: JULY 17, 2019**
- 3. PUBLIC COMMENT**
- 4. OLD BUSINESS:**
- 5. NEW BUSINESS:**
 - a) Review and Discuss lawsuits pertaining to CalARP/PSM regs.
- 6. REPORTS FROM COMMISSIONERS ON MATTERS OF COMMISSION INTEREST Members**
 - a) Discuss proposal to expand the use of the Underground Storage Tank clean-up fund for other types of sites.
- 7. PLAN NEXT AGENDA**
- 8. ADJOURNMENT**

Attachments

Questions: Call Michael Kent (925) 313-6587

Any disclosable public records related to an open session item on a regular meeting agenda and distributed by Contra Costa Health Services to a majority of members of the Hazardous Materials Commission less than 72 hours prior to that meeting are available for public inspection at 597 Center Avenue in Martinez

**Contra Costa County Hazardous Materials Commission
597 Center Avenue, Suite 200, Martinez CA 94553 (925) 313-6712 Fax (925) 313-6721**

Hazardous Materials Commission

Draft Minutes

Planning and Policy Development Committee

July 17, 2019

Members and Alternates:

Present: Jonathan Bash, Mark Hughes, Frank Gordon, Jim Payne, George Smith, Tim Bancroft (alternate)

Absent: Don Bristol, Mark Ross

Staff: Michael Kent

Members of the Public: none

1. Call to order, introductions and announcements

Commissioner Payne called the meeting to order at 4:05.

Announcements:

Michael Kent announced:

- ◆ The Commission annual meeting with Supervisor Anderson will be on July 26 and with Supervisor Gioia on August 13.
- ◆ The recommendations the Commission made to the Board of Supervisors concerning pipeline safety will go to the Transportation, Water and Infrastructure committee on September 9th at 9:00.

Commissioner Smith announced that Richmond Planning Commission is considering a zoning ordinance to prohibit coal and coke loading in Richmond at their July 18th meeting at 6:30.

2. Public Comments: None

3. Approval of Minutes:

The minutes from the May 15, 2019 meeting were moved by Commissioner Gordon, seconded by Commissioner Hughes and approved 4-0-2 with Commissioners Bristol and Payne abstaining.

4. Old Business:

a) Develop questions to ask the speaker at the July Commission meeting concerning the DTSC vulnerable communities permitting project (SB 673)

The committee developed the following questions for Ingrid Brostrom of the Center for Race, Poverty and the Environment:

- 1) Do you consider the level of public concern when determining the regulatory pathway?
- 2) What is the level of public engagement and will that impact the result?
- 3) Will this approach be expanded to other facilities in defined geographic areas or by industry type?
- 4) Why did they choose to limit the program to the facilities that they did?
- 5) Is your main goal for this program - outreach and education or mitigations.
- 6) What was your organization's history with the bill.
- 7) Is EnviroScreen 3.0 a valid tool to use for this process.

They were also interested in her response to the concerns of industry that were raised last month:

- fails to Address DTSC's Responsibility to Deliver Safe, Effective Haz Waste Mgmt System in California
- Track I Regulations Already Addressed Vulnerability / Impacts
- Expectation Setting - What is Achievable?
- Confusing - How are other DTSC authorities/mandates addressed?
- AB 617 Contrast, Lack of Alignment
- Nexus?
- Inappropriately Comingles/Confuses Cumulative Impacts, Community Vulnerability, Cumulative Pollution Burden
- Lack of Transparency/Consistency in Decisions and Criteria
- Uncertain Science / Causal Relationship
- Screening Tools Problematic

5) New Business: None

6) Items of Interest:

Commissioner Gordon passed around a flyer from BART that indicated they were looking for someone to serve in the Environmental Justice seat on their advisory board.

7) Plan Next Agenda: The committee would continue the discussion of SB 673 if necessary.

8) Adjournment – The meeting was adjourned at 5:30.

Attachment

Item 1

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15 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
16 FOR THE COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

17 WESTERN STATES PETROLEUM
18 ASSOCIATION, a California not-for-profit
corporation,

19 Plaintiff,

20 v.

21 CALIFORNIA OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH
22 AND SAFETY STANDARDS BOARD,
CALIFORNIA DIVISION OF
23 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH,
and CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S OFFICE
24 OF EMERGENCY SERVICES,

25 Defendants.

CASE NO. _____

WESTERN STATES PETROLEUM
ASSOCIATION'S COMPLAINT FOR
DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF TO DETERMINE INVALIDITY OF
REGULATORY PROVISIONS (GOV.
CODE, § 11350; CODE CIV. PROC., § 1060)

26 Plaintiff Western States Petroleum Association ("WSPA") brings this complaint for
27 declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to Government Code section 11350, to declare invalid and
28 unenforceable certain regulations at California Code of Regulations, tit. 8, sections 5189.1, et seq.,

BY FAX

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16 FOR THE COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

17 WESTERN STATES PETROLEUM
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21 CALIFORNIA OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH
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26 Plaintiff Western States Petroleum Association ("WSPA") brings this complaint for
27 declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to Government Code section 11350, to declare invalid and
28 unenforceable certain regulations at California Code of Regulations, tit. 8, sections 5189.1, et seq.,

1 and California Code of Regulations, tit. 19, sections 2735.1, et seq. (together, the “Regulations”),
2 promulgated by the California Occupational Safety and Health Standards Board (the “Board”)—and
3 to be enforced by the California Department of Occupational Safety and Health (“DOSH”)—and the
4 Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (“OES”), respectively, on the grounds that the Regulations
5 violate the California Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), Government Code, sections 11342.2
6 and 11349, subdivisions (a), (c), and (d).

7 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

8 1. The challenged Regulations vastly expand both the scope and requirements of
9 California’s process safety management regulations applicable to petroleum refiners, without
10 providing any justification or explanation as to the need for such sweeping changes to the regulatory
11 regime. In a dramatic departure from the prior approach—which set threshold quantities necessary to
12 trigger application of the rules and which continues to govern all other facilities in the state—the new
13 rules for petroleum refineries apply to processes using any amount of certain chemicals. Similarly,
14 the extensive and duplicative safety reviews for “major changes” appear to be triggered by almost
15 any change to equipment at a refinery, no matter how trivial. The Regulations also seem to require
16 petroleum refiners to conduct an impossibly broad, worldwide search for potentially relevant
17 literature as part of the safety-review process. Moreover, the Regulations inexplicably provide for
18 participation in a refinery’s safety reviews by unqualified union-designated representatives who lack
19 any employment connection to the refinery, while they require non-union employee representatives to
20 be qualified for such participation and located on-site. On top of all this, the Regulations exceed the
21 agencies’ statutory authority because they purport to extend to chemicals not designated as “regulated
22 substances” in the enabling statute—as OES itself admitted in the rulemaking.

23 2. Under the APA, the Board, DOSH, and OES must provide substantial evidence that
24 the Regulations are reasonably necessary to advance statutorily authorized goals. For key aspects of
25 the Regulations, however, the agencies have failed to give any explanation *at all*, much less to show
26 with substantial *evidence* how these extreme measures can be justified as a matter of law or common
27 sense.

1 3. The Board and OES also failed to provide the necessary clarity—due to ambiguous,
2 vague, and undefined language in the Regulations, as well as conflicting and confusing responses to
3 public comments—for petroleum refiners reasonably to ascertain how to achieve compliance with the
4 new rules. A number of the new provisions leave refiners to guess what is required to meet the
5 state’s regulatory standards on pain of significant penalty, including possibly even criminal liability,
6 for guessing wrong. For example, the purported definition of “major change”—a key component of
7 the regulatory scheme—is no definition at all: It refers conclusorily to changes that “worsen” or
8 “increase” process safety hazards, without providing any objective standard by which refiners may
9 determine what those terms mean in practice. Likewise, the definition of “highly hazardous material”
10 merely cross-references California and federal hazard communication regulations, which are highly
11 complex and not designed for process safety management purposes, replacing lists developed by the
12 agencies that previously set forth the specific chemicals that activate the regulatory requirements at
13 petroleum refineries and which continue to apply to all other facilities in the state.

14 4. Taken together, these infirmities create a serious adverse impact on petroleum
15 refineries throughout California that the Board, DOSH, and OES have failed to confront. Under the
16 new regulatory regime, petroleum refiners apparently must perform virtually perpetual safety
17 reviews, regardless of the significance of a triggering event, based on a potentially never-ending,
18 international quest for governing standards. The agencies adopted these measures without adequate
19 consideration of their real-world costs or demonstration of their asserted benefits. The agencies
20 performed only a perfunctory and inherently flawed economic impact analysis based entirely on a
21 survey of petroleum refiners that, as the final report itself found, produced “significant variance in . . .
22 results” because “one could interpret the regulatory language in multiple ways.” (RAND Report, at
23 pp. xii, 7-8.) That disparity is unsurprising, since the survey expressly excluded any guidance on the
24 proper interpretation of the Regulations’ circular and confusing terms. But without any objective
25 criteria or guidance as to what the rules would actually require, the survey data—and resulting
26 “analysis” thereof—are inherently and fatally flawed. The *outputs* of the survey are only as good as
27 the *inputs*, and the inputs were no more clear than the hopelessly indeterminate Regulations
28

1 themselves. Consequently, the agencies have never confronted, much less properly considered, the
2 true potential costs of the final Regulations.

3 5. The Regulations therefore significantly harm WSPA and its member companies, upon
4 which they impose unacceptable burdens and uncertainty. They are invalid and cannot stand.

5 BACKGROUND

6 6. As amended in 1990, section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. section 7412)
7 directed the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and the federal Occupational
8 Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) to develop regulations to prevent accidental chemical
9 releases. In response, the EPA and OSHA each adopted accident prevention plans to gather
10 information on chemical accidents and to encourage industry members to improve process safety.
11 The plan led by OSHA became known as Process Safety Management (“PSM”), and the plan led by
12 the EPA became known as the Risk Management Plan.

13 7. Pursuant to its congressional mandate, OSHA published a Final Rule for Process
14 Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals on February 24, 1992. (Code Fed. Regs., tit. 29,
15 section 1910.119.) This rule applies to processes involving chemicals, flammable gases, and
16 flammable liquids above certain threshold quantities.

17 8. In 1996, the EPA promulgated a final rule for accident prevention under the Risk
18 Management Plan. (Code Fed. Regs., tit. 40, section 68.1 et seq.) This rule requires owners or
19 operators of facilities with more than a threshold quantity of a regulated substance to develop an
20 accident prevention program.

21 9. Meanwhile, at the state level, the California State Legislature passed a law in 1986
22 calling for the development of an accident prevention plan, which would become known as the
23 California Accidental Release Prevention (“CalARP”) program. (Health & Safety Code section
24 25531, et seq.) The CalARP program tracks the requirements of section 112(r) of the federal Clean
25 Air Act and also includes other state-specific requirements. (Health & Safety Code section 25533.)
26 Among other things, this legislation required OES to adopt regulations for the CalARP program.
27 OES promulgated its original CalARP regulations in 1997. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 19, section 2735.3.)
28

1 10. In 1990—the same year Congress amended the Clean Air Act—the California State
2 Legislature enacted legislation calling for the Board to implement state PSM standards (Lab. Code
3 section 7855, et seq.) to “prevent or minimize the consequences of catastrophic releases of toxic,
4 flammable, or explosive chemicals.”

5 11. In 1992, the Board adopted state PSM standards, codified at California Code of
6 Regulations, tit. 8, section 5189. These standards apply to more than 1,900 facilities in the state,
7 including, but not limited to, petroleum refineries.

8 12. In 2012, the Governor’s Interagency Working Group on Refinery Safety (the
9 “Working Group”) issued a report concerning the safety of petroleum refineries in California. The
10 Working Group’s report recommended the establishment of an Interagency Refinery Task Force to,
11 among other things, coordinate refinery-specific revisions to the state’s PSM regulations and the
12 CalARP regulations.

13 13. In 2013, the California State Legislature passed legislation mandating that the Board
14 adopt PSM standards for petroleum refineries. (Lab. Code section 7856.)

15 14. Invoking that requirement, the Board promulgated a new PSM regulatory scheme
16 applicable to petroleum refineries in July 2017. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, section 5189.1, et seq.) This
17 regulatory scheme takes the form of the PSM regulation challenged herein (the “CalPSM
18 Regulation”). A “general” violation of the CalPSM Regulation carries a \$13,047 per-violation
19 penalty (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, section 336, subd. (b)), and a “serious” violation of the CalPSM
20 Regulation carries an \$18,000 to \$25,000 per-violation penalty (*id.*, section 336, subd. (c)). The
21 penalty for a “willful” violation is multiplied by five, up to \$130,464 per violation, and repeat
22 violations are likewise subject to a scale of multipliers (i.e., two times for the first repeat; four times
23 for the second repeat; ten times for the third repeat, up to \$130,464 per violation). (Cal. Code Regs.,
24 tit. 8, section 336 subds. (g) and (h).) The failure to abate a violation can result in a daily penalty of
25 up to \$15,000. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, section 336 subd. (f).) The Board and DOSH claim, and
26 WSPA disputes, that the CalPSM Regulation satisfies the mandate of Labor Code section 7856.

27 15. OES also promulgated a new CalARP regulatory scheme applicable to petroleum
28 refineries in California (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 19, section 2735.1, et seq.), which is challenged herein

1 (the “CalARP Regulation”). A “general” violation of the CalARP Regulation results in a civil
2 penalty of up to \$2,000 per day plus the cost of any associated emergencies or remediation. (Health
3 & Safety Code section 25540, subd. (a)(1).) A “knowing” violation of the CalARP Regulation
4 results in a civil penalty of up to \$25,000 per day (plus associated emergency or remediation costs),
5 as well as misdemeanor criminal liability. (Health & Safety Code sections 25540, subds. (a)(3), (b),
6 and 25540.1.) OES claims, and WSPA disputes, that the CalARP Regulation is authorized by Health
7 and Safety Code section 25531, et seq.

8 16. The CalPSM Regulation and the CalARP Regulation are substantively similar and,
9 according to the Board and OES, are designed to function in tandem. The pre-existing PSM
10 standards and CalARP Program continue to apply to all other regulated facilities in California, *other*
11 *than* petroleum refineries.

12 17. The Regulations suffer from several specific legal infirmities and are unlawful and
13 invalid for the following, among other, reasons.

14 18. First, the Regulations vastly expand the scope of regulated chemicals at petroleum
15 refineries as compared with the pre-existing regulations and eliminate the requirement that a
16 threshold quantity of such chemicals exist before process safety management requirements apply.
17 The Regulations do not explain why this expansion in scope is necessary to achieve the safety of
18 petroleum refineries but not any of the many other facilities in California that may use the same
19 chemicals in the same or greater quantities. The Regulations also incorporate an expansive and
20 vague definition of “highly hazardous material” that is neither readily understandable nor reasonably
21 necessary. Further, the CalARP Regulation purports to apply to “highly hazardous material” that
22 OES *admits* is beyond the scope of chemicals that it is authorized to regulate in its enabling statute.

23 19. Second, the term “major change,” a critical component of both sets of Regulations, is
24 defined so broadly as to incorporate even trivial changes, contains language that conflicts with
25 existing agency guidance, and fails generally to put regulated parties on fair notice of what
26 constitutes a “major change.” This confusion is heightened by the fact that the CalPSM Regulation
27 and the CalARP Regulation contain different and conflicting definitions of “major change.” The
28 definitions also create overlapping obligations with pre-existing PSM standards that render the

1 Regulations' additional requirements not reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of their
2 enabling statutes.

3 20. Third, the Hierarchy of Hazard Control provisions of the Regulations contain
4 undefined terms and phrases that render them impossibly broad and leave them with no objectively
5 ascertainable meaning. For example, the Regulations appear to require refiners to conduct a
6 worldwide review of publicly available information regarding inherent safety measures and
7 safeguards used in the petroleum and "related" industries, including those that have been "achieved in
8 practice," without defining what industries are "related" to the petroleum industry, nor what it means
9 to "achieve in practice" an inherent safety measure or safeguard. These provisions also contain
10 internally conflicting requirements regarding implementation of damage control mechanisms without
11 providing any guidance as to how to deal with such conflicts. At the same time, the prescriptive
12 elements of the Hierarchy of Hazard Control, such as those requiring recommendations to eliminate
13 hazards in a prescribed order of priorities, do not provide the discretion necessary to effectuate the
14 performance-based regulatory goals of the Regulations and their enabling statutes.

15 21. Fourth, the Regulations require the participation of an "employee representative" in all
16 elements of process safety management. While the Regulations require "employee representatives"
17 at non-union refineries to be qualified to participate and to work on-site at the refinery, "employee
18 representatives" at refineries with unionized employees, by contrast, are not required to meet these
19 prerequisites. That is, union employee representatives may be *unqualified* to serve as employee
20 representatives at a facility and have no experience as an employee at that facility. The Regulations
21 offer no justification or explanation for this disparate and irrational treatment of union and non-union
22 employees, which both conflict with the stated purpose of the Regulations and are not reasonably
23 necessary to effectuate the purpose of the enabling statutes.

24 22. Fifth, the agencies' consideration of the economic impact of these sweeping new
25 Regulations and the substantial new burdens they place on refiners in California was inadequate. In
26 the course of promulgating the Regulations, and prior to issuing their Initial Statements of Reasons,
27 the Board and OES commissioned the RAND Corporation ("RAND") to perform a required
28 economic impact assessment, the results of which RAND published in a report titled "Cost-Benefit

1 Analysis of Proposed California Oil and Gas Refinery Regulations” (the “RAND Report”). But
2 RAND employed an invalid survey methodology in conducting its economic impact analysis and
3 relied on data of questionable significance and reliability, choosing to ignore other highly relevant
4 and significantly more reliable data. In so doing, the agencies concluded, contrary to the substantial
5 evidence, that the Regulations would not have a significant, statewide economic impact, and they
6 ignored public concerns that the Regulations will actually impose substantial and unreasonable costs
7 on the state and its citizens.

8 23. The infirmities of key terms and provisions in the CalPSM and CalARP Regulations
9 and the inadequacy of the agencies’ economic impact analysis infect the Regulations, rendering
10 provisions of the CalPSM Regulation and the CalARP Regulation, discussed above, invalid and
11 unenforceable against petroleum refiners in this State.

12 PARTIES

13 24. Plaintiff WSPA is a California not-for-profit corporation and long-standing trade
14 association of energy companies that own and operate properties and facilities in the petroleum
15 industry, including petroleum refineries in California. WSPA’s principal offices are located at 1415
16 L Street, Suite 600, Sacramento, California, 95814. WSPA’s members operate petroleum refineries
17 in Contra Costa, Los Angeles, and other California counties.

18 25. WSPA has associational standing to bring this suit on behalf of its members because
19 more than one of those members will be directly, adversely, and imminently affected by the
20 Regulations and thus would have standing to sue in their own right.* If the Regulations are not
21 enjoined, WSPA’s members face the “immediate or threatened injury” of enforcement actions. (*Hunt*
22 *v. Wash. State Apple Advertising Comm’n* (1977) 432 U.S. 333, 342.) Furthermore, the interests that
23 WSPA seeks to protect by way of this lawsuit are germane to the organization’s purpose.
24 Specifically, WSPA is dedicated to addressing the wide range of public policy issues that affect the
25 petroleum industry, including state regulations such as CalARP and CalPSM that impose
26

27
28 * A list of WSPA’s current members is available on its website: <https://www.wspa.org/about/> (last visited July 1, 2019).

1 unreasonable and unlawful mandates on WSPA members. Finally, neither the claims asserted nor the
2 relief requested requires an individual member of WSPA to participate in this suit.

3 26. WSPA has an interest in obtaining a judicial declaration as to the validity of the
4 Regulations because its members own and operate most of the petroleum refineries in California,
5 which are subject to the Regulations. WSPA's members have been or will be impacted by the
6 enforcement of the Regulations. Such enforcement was or will be illegal and unlawful for the
7 reasons explained herein.

8 27. Defendant California Occupational Safety and Health Standards Board is a seven-
9 member body appointed by the Governor and charged with setting standards for the California
10 Division of Occupational Safety and Health. The Board promulgated the CalPSM Regulation
11 challenged herein and has its principal offices at 2520 Venture Oaks Way, Suite 350, Sacramento,
12 California, 95833.

13 28. Defendant California Division of Occupational Safety and Health enforces
14 occupational safety and health standards and regulations and offers training and consultation to
15 employers and their employees for complying with occupational safety and health standards and
16 regulations. DOSH is charged with enforcing the CalPSM Regulation challenged herein and has its
17 principle offices at 1515 Clay Street, Suite 1901, Oakland, California, 94612.

18 29. Defendant Governor's Office of Emergency Services is a cabinet-level state public
19 agency within the Office of the Governor of California. OES is charged with assuring the state's
20 readiness to respond to and recover from all hazards and is responsible for overall state agency
21 response to disasters. OES promulgated the CalARP Regulation challenged herein and has its
22 principal offices at 2650 Shriever Avenue, Mather, California, 95655, and 10390 Peter A. McCuen
23 Boulevard, Mather, California, 95655.

24 JURISDICTION AND VENUE

25 30. WSPA brings this action pursuant to Government Code section 11350.

26 31. Venue is proper in this Court because Defendant CalPSM is located in Sacramento,
27 California and Defendant OES is located in Mather, California, which is located in Sacramento
28 County. (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code section 395.)

1 **PROCEDURAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND**

2 **A. Promulgation Of The CalPSM And CalARP Regulations**

3 32. The Board issued its notice of proposed rulemaking and Initial Statement of Reasons
4 for the CalPSM Regulation on July 15, 2016, setting the public comment period from July 15, 2016
5 to September 15, 2016 and a public hearing date of September 15, 2016. WSPA submitted comments
6 to the Board on September 15, 2016. On February 10, 2017, the Board issued a notice of proposed
7 modifications and set a deadline of March 3, 2017 for comments on the modifications to the proposed
8 regulation. WSPA submitted comments on the proposed modifications. Thereafter, the Board issued
9 a Final Statement of Reasons, failing to adequately address several of the public comments, including
10 many of those submitted by WSPA and its members. The CalPSM Regulation was approved by the
11 Office of Administrative Law and filed with the Secretary of State on July 27, 2017. The CalPSM
12 Regulation became effective on October 1, 2017.

13 33. OES issued its notice of proposed rulemaking and Initial Statement of Reasons for the
14 CalARP Regulation on July 15, 2016, setting the public comment period from July 15, 2016 to
15 September 15, 2016 and a public hearing date of August 31, 2016. WSPA submitted comments to
16 OES on September 15, 2016. On February 14, 2017, OES issued a notice of modification of text of
17 proposed regulations and set a deadline of March 3, 2017 for comments on the modifications to the
18 proposed regulation. WSPA submitted comments on the proposed modifications. Thereafter, OES
19 issued a Final Statement of Reasons, which failed to adequately address several of the public
20 comments, including many of those submitted by WSPA and its members. The CalARP Regulation
21 was approved by the Office of Administrative Law and filed with the Secretary of State on August
22 18, 2017. The CalARP Regulation became effective on October 1, 2017.

23 **B. To Be Valid, A Regulation Must Be Authorized By The Enabling Statute And Satisfy**
24 **The APA’s Requirements Of “Necessity” And “Clarity”**

25 34. The California Administrative Procedure Act, Government Code section 11340, et
26 seq., provides that a regulation must meet standards for (1) necessity, (2) authority, (3) consistency,
27 (4) clarity, (5) reference, and (6) nonduplication. (Gov. Code section 11349.)

1 35. Under the “authority” requirement, “no regulation adopted is valid or effective unless
2 consistent and not in conflict with the statute.” (Gov. Code section 11342.2.)

3 36. With respect to “necessity,” “no regulation adopted is valid or effective
4 unless . . . reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the statute.” (Gov. Code section
5 11342.2.) “Necessity” is established only where “the record of the rulemaking proceeding
6 demonstrates by substantial evidence the need for a regulation to effectuate the purpose of the statute,
7 court decision, or other provision of law that the regulation implements, interprets, or makes specific,
8 taking into account the totality of the record.” (Gov. Code. section 11349, subd. (a).)

9 37. Compliance with the “necessity” standard requires more than a general discussion of
10 the need for a regulatory action as a whole or simply a description of the regulatory action. It
11 requires *substantial evidence* that each provision of a proposed regulation is required to carry out the
12 purpose of a particular statute. When an agency proposes a new regulation, the agency must issue an
13 Initial Statement of Reasons, which includes “[a] statement of the specific purpose of each adoption
14 [or] amendment . . . , the problem the agency intends to address, and the rationale for the
15 determination by the agency that each adoption [or] amendment . . . is reasonably necessary to carry
16 out the purpose and address the problem for which it is proposed.” (Gov. Code section 11346.2,
17 subd. (b).)

18 38. Further, an agency proposing to adopt a regulation must “assess the potential for
19 adverse economic impact on California business enterprises” and avoid “the imposition of
20 unnecessary or unreasonable regulations” in this regard. (Gov. Code section 11346.3, subd. (a).)

21 39. The APA also requires that regulations have sufficient “clarity,” meaning that they are
22 “written or displayed so that the meaning . . . will be easily understood by those persons directly
23 affected by them.” (Gov. Code section 11349, subd. (c).)

24 40. A regulation “may be declared to be invalid for a substantial failure to comply with”
25 any requirement of the APA. (Gov. Code section 11350, subd. (a).) For the reasons set forth below,
26 the challenged provisions of the Regulations do not comply with the APA’s standards for authority,
27 necessity, and clarity.

28

1 GROUND S FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF

A. **The CalPSM And CalARP Regulations Unlawfully Expand The Scope Of Processes To Which They Apply**

1. **The Definitions of “Highly Hazardous Material” Do Not Meet the APA’s Requirements of “Clarity” and “Necessity”**

41. The requirements set forth in the Regulations are applicable to a “process” within a petroleum refinery. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, section 5189.1, subd. (b); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 19, section 2762.0.1.)

42. Section 5189.1, subdivision (c) of the CalPSM Regulation defines “process” to mean “[p]etroleum refinery activities including use, storage, manufacturing, handling, piping or on-site movement that involve a *highly hazardous material*.” (Italics added.) Similarly, section 2735.3, subdivision (yy) of the CalARP Regulation defines “process” to mean “petroleum refining activities involving a *highly hazardous material*, including use, storage, manufacturing, handling, piping, or on-site movement.” (Italics added.) In turn, both Regulations define “highly hazardous material” to mean a flammable liquid or gas or a toxic or reactive substance, as defined in California Code of Regulations, tit. 8, section 5194. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, section 5189.1, subd. (c); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 19, section 2735.3, subd. (y).)

43. California Code of Regulations, tit. 8, section 5194—the California hazard communication regulations—incorporates the federal hazard communications regulations at Code of Federal Regulations, tit. 29, section 1910.1200, which provides specific tests for determining whether a chemical qualifies as a flammable liquid or gas or a toxic or reactive substance. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, section 5194, subd. (d)(3)(B).)

44. The federal hazard communications regulations are highly complex and not intended for process safety management purposes. Prior to the adoption of the Regulations, refineries had only to reference lists, developed by the Board and OES, of particular chemicals constituting “regulated substances” to determine the chemicals and threshold quantities that triggered the process safety management regulations. More specifically, the previous regulations applied only to processes that involved certain specified chemicals in quantities at or above specified thresholds or flammable liquids and gases in a quantity of 10,000 pounds or more. Under the previous regulations, therefore,

1 determining whether a substance was “regulated” was clear, straightforward, and easy to understand.
2 The Regulations, however, have significantly expanded the scope of chemicals that trigger the
3 process safety management requirements by replacing the straightforward *lists* with an entirely new
4 set of *standards* that are contained in a different regulation concerning hazard *communications*.

5 45. WSPA and others raised concerns in their public comments regarding the confusion
6 and burden created by incorporation of the federal hazard communication regulations into the
7 Regulations. The Board failed to address these concerns in its Final Statement of Reasons,
8 responding only that “[t]he definitions specify what constitutes a highly hazardous material The
9 definitions clarify terms to assist employers in understanding the intent and requirements of the
10 regulations.” Likewise, OES conclusorily stated that it “maintains that the definition clearly specifies
11 what constitutes a highly hazardous material” and that it would “take no action on this comment.”
12 Neither the Board nor OES has provided any rationale for the necessity of these revisions or offered
13 any explanation of, or justification for, their expansion of scope beyond those chemicals regulated at
14 all other industrial facilities in California.

15 46. Moreover, by incorporating the federal hazard communication regulations without
16 providing any guidance as to their relevance with respect to application of the Regulations, or setting
17 forth clear guidelines for determining whether a given substance is subject to the Regulations, the
18 definitions of “highly hazardous material” in the Regulations are not readily understandable.

19 47. In addition to expanding the scope of covered chemicals, the Regulations eliminate
20 prior threshold quantities below which chemicals were exempt from regulation under the pre-existing
21 CalPSM Standards and CalARP Program. The prior regulations—which remain applicable to all
22 facilities other than petroleum refineries—apply to any process that involves certain specified
23 chemicals in quantities at or above specified thresholds or flammable liquids or gases in a quantity of
24 10,000 pounds or more. By contrast, the Regulations appear to apply to petroleum refineries when
25 *any quantity*, however insignificant, of *any covered chemical* exists, as no threshold quantities are
26 found in either the definition of “highly hazardous materials” or elsewhere in the Regulations.

27 48. Neither the Board nor OES provided any explanation or justification whatsoever for so
28 significantly expanding the types and quantities of chemicals covered by eliminating quantity

1 thresholds and subjecting petroleum refineries to process safety management regulation for use of
2 any quantity of any covered chemical. In its Initial Statement of Reasons, the Board claimed that the
3 definition of “highly hazardous material” was necessary to “specify the threshold quantities of
4 materials covered by these regulations,” apparently unaware that the CalPSM Regulation contained
5 no such thresholds. WSPA and others raised concerns regarding elimination of the thresholds, but
6 neither agency provided any substantive response to these concerns.

7 49. Because the agencies have offered no basis whatsoever—*much less substantial*
8 *evidence*—to support the conclusion that use of even the smallest quantities of reactive, toxic, or
9 flammable chemicals present hazards of a magnitude sufficient to justify the complex process safety
10 management regimes in the Regulations, the definitions of “highly hazardous material” in the
11 Regulations are not reasonably necessary.

12 2. The CalARP Regulation Lacks Statutory Authorization

13 50. The CalARP Regulation cites as the basis of its authority Health & Safety Code
14 section 25531, et seq., which is intended to prevent “accidental releases of *regulated substances*.”
15 (Health & Safety Code section 25531, subd. (e), italics added.) The purported purpose of the
16 CalARP Program likewise is to “prevent the accidental releases of *regulated substances*.” (Cal. Code
17 Regs., tit. 19, section 2735.1, italics added.) Section 25532 defines “regulated substance” as either a
18 “regulated substance” under the federal Clean Air Act regulations, or a chemical that has been
19 designated by OES as an “extremely hazardous substance.” (Healthy & Safety Code section 25532,
20 subd. (j).)

21 51. The CalARP Regulation, however, applies not only to “regulated substances,” but also
22 to all “highly hazardous material,” as defined in section 2735.3, subdivision (y). As described above,
23 the definition of “highly hazardous material” goes beyond the narrower category of “regulated
24 substances.” Notably, OES has admitted to this expansion, stating in its Initial Statement of Reasons
25 that the CalARP Regulation is “designed to go beyond a list of regulated substances to the goal of
26 protecting public health” and confirming the same in its responses to comments.

27 52. Although OES has authority to designate chemicals as extremely hazardous (and
28 thereby identify additional “regulated substances” to be covered by section 25532), OES has not

1 undertaken to expand the list of “extremely hazardous substances” to encompass “highly hazardous
2 materials” under the Regulations.

3 53. The disconnect between the scope of the CalARP Regulation and the enabling statute
4 is further evidenced by the fact that the CalARP Program now has two separate and inconsistent
5 definitions of “process.” The definition of “process” applicable to facilities other than refineries
6 refers to “regulated substance[s],” while the definition of “process” applicable to refineries refers to
7 the more expansive “highly hazardous material.” OES has not offered any justification for its
8 selective departure from the statutorily prescribed application to “regulated substances” for refineries
9 but not for any other facilities.

10 54. OES’s elimination of the requirement of a threshold quantity of regulated substances
11 is also inconsistent with the enabling statute. Health & Safety Code section 25532, subdivision (c)
12 expressly defines “covered process” as “a process that has a regulated substance present in more than
13 a threshold quantity.” Additionally, Health & Safety Code section 25532, subdivision (d) requires
14 OES to adopt threshold quantities, for which Health & Safety Code sections 25543.1, subdivision (g)
15 and 25543.3 provide specific criteria and procedures. By eliminating threshold quantities, the
16 CalARP Regulation is inconsistent, and in conflict, with its enabling statute.

17 **B. The Definitions Of “Major Change” In The CalPSM And CalARP Regulations Lack**
18 **“Clarity” And “Necessity”**

19 55. The requirement to perform various process safety reviews provided for in the
20 Regulations is triggered by a “major change.” The term “major change” is therefore critical to the
21 Regulations, as both the Board and OES acknowledged during the rulemaking process. But “major
22 change” is defined with insufficient clarity to provide regulated entities adequate notice as to when
23 the Regulations apply.

24 56. The CalPSM Regulation defines “major change” as “[i]ntroduction of a new process,
25 new process equipment, or new highly hazardous material; [a]ny operational change outside of
26 established safe operating limits; or, [a]ny alteration that introduces a new process safety hazard or
27 worsens an existing process safety hazard.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, section 5189.1, subd. (c).)
28

1 57. The CalARP Regulations define “major change” as “(1) introduction of a new process,
2 or (2) new process equipment, or new regulated substance that results in any operational change
3 outside of established safe operating limits; or (3) any alteration in a process, process equipment, or
4 process chemistry that introduces a new hazard or increases an existing hazard.” (Cal. Code Regs.,
5 tit. 19, section 2735.3, subd. (hh).)

6 58. These two definitions of “major change” are different such that an event may
7 constitute a major change triggering process safety reviews under one regulatory scheme but not
8 under the other. The agencies declined to reconcile the Regulations’ definitions of “major change”
9 during the rulemaking process, adding to the confusion and difficulty for refineries implementing
10 them.

11 59. Regardless of this difference, the Regulations’ definitions of “major change” share an
12 extreme over-breadth, causing them to apply not just to major changes, but also to minor changes.
13 As a result, *any* new equipment employed in a refinery could potentially trigger an array of safety
14 reviews in addition to standard management of change processes, particularly under the CalPSM
15 regime. For example, the term “major change” in both of the Regulations incorporates changes to
16 “process equipment,” which is in turn defined as “equipment, including . . . piping.” (Cal. Code
17 Regs., tit. 8, section 5189.1, subd. (c); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 19, section 2735.3, subd. (zz).) Indeed,
18 the agencies confirmed that the term “process equipment” covers “all equipment in service and
19 equipment that may be used in the future” Thus, an extremely minor change such as replacing a
20 piping flange could constitute a “major change” under the regulatory language, particularly under the
21 CalPSM Regulation, which renders the mere “introduction of . . . new process equipment” a “major
22 change.”

23 60. Despite the plain meaning of this language, OES stated in its Final Statement of
24 Reasons that “truly minor equipment changes do not constitute ‘major changes,’” and that
25 “replacement of a minor piping flange” would not constitute a “major change.” But OES completely
26 failed to provide any explanation for its rationale, or provide any explanation more broadly as to how
27 a “major change” should or would be interpreted. The Board, on the other hand, offered no
28 substantive response to comments regarding the over-breadth of the definition of “major change,”

1 particularly with respect to the question whether the definition encompassed truly minor changes
2 such as the replacement of a piping flange. This conflict between the regulatory language and OES's
3 guidance, as just one example, makes the definition of "major change" not readily understandable.
4 (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 1, section 16, subd. (a)(2).)

5 61. As another example, any alteration that "worsens" an existing process safety hazard
6 (under the CalPSM Regulation) or "increases" an existing process safety hazard (under the CalARP
7 Regulation) is considered a "major change." (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, section 5189.1, subd. (c); Cal.
8 Code Regs., tit. 19, section 2735.3, subd. (hh).) Because the Regulations contain no objective
9 guidance for determining what constitutes a "worsen[ing]" or "increase" of an existing process safety
10 hazard (and in the absence of such objective guidance, a determination would be inherently
11 subjective), the terms "worsens" and "increases" are ambiguous and subject to more than one
12 meaning. For this reason as well, the definitions of "major change" in the Regulations are not readily
13 understandable by petroleum refiners.

14 62. Further, the definitions of "major change" in the Regulations create different
15 categories of changes deemed to be "major" (e.g., the introduction of a new process, the introduction
16 of new process equipment, etc.). The pre-existing process safety management standards, however,
17 already ensured that all changes (except for replacements in-kind) would be evaluated for safety
18 impacts. The Regulations now impose a number of additional requirements, including additional
19 safety reviews, for the specified categories of "major change[s]." This creates overlapping burdens
20 on refineries without adequate explanation or justification, which renders the definition of "major
21 change" not reasonably necessary.

22 **C. The Provisions In The CalPSM And CalARP Regulations Requiring Performance Of**
23 **Hierarchy Of Hazard Controls Analyses Lack "Clarity" And "Necessity."**

24 63. The Regulations require refiners to assemble a team to perform a Hierarchy of
25 Hazards Control Analysis ("HCA") every five years for all existing processes, as well as in response
26 to certain triggers, such as whenever a major change (as described above) is proposed. (Cal. Code
27 Regs., tit. 8, section 5189.1, subd. (c); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 19, section 2762.13.) A "Hierarchy of
28 Hazard Control" is defined as hazard "prevention and control measures, in priority order, to eliminate

1 or minimize a hazard.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, section 5189.1(c); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 19, section
2 2735.3, subd. (x).)

3 64. The lack of clarity with respect to the definition of “major change,” as described
4 above, infects the HCA provisions, making it unclear to refiners when the HCA provisions even
5 apply.

6 65. The Regulations require that a team evaluate different measures to control hazards,
7 and further require that the team recommend, to the greatest extent feasible, inherent safety measures
8 that will eliminate hazards. Where no feasible inherently safe measures exist, the team is required to
9 recommend safeguards to mitigate hazards, with priority given to passive safeguards, followed by
10 active safeguards, with procedural safeguards used only as a last resort. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8,
11 section 5189.1, subd. (c); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 19, section 2735.3, subd. (x).)

12 66. The Regulations require the HCA team to identify, analyze, and document publicly
13 available information on inherent safety measures and safeguards, including those “1. achieved in
14 practice by the petroleum refining industry and related industrial sectors; [or] 2. required or
15 recommended for the petroleum refining industry and related industrial sectors, by a federal or state
16 agency, or local California agency, in a regulation or report.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, section 5189.1,
17 subd. (l)(4)(D); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 19, section 2762.13, subd. (e).)

18 67. Further, the Regulations do not specify what constitutes a “related industry sector.” In
19 addition, the agencies refused to provide any clarification during the rulemaking process as to the
20 meaning of “related industry sector,” despite receiving comments as to the term’s vagueness and
21 failure to specify which sectors an HCA team must consider when performing its HCA.

22 68. The requirement to identify, analyze, and document publicly available information on
23 inherent safety measures and safeguards “achieved in practice” is impossibly broad and has no
24 objectively ascertainable meaning. The provisions apparently require petroleum refiners to conduct a
25 worldwide search for potentially relevant literature and then make a subjective determination as to
26 whether such literature describes an “inherently safe” measure or safeguard that has been “achieved
27 in practice.” Rather than providing any clarification or tethering these HCA requirements to any
28 recognized industry standards, the agencies have confirmed that refiners’ obligations extend to *all*

1 “publicly available information on inherent safety measures and safeguards.” The agencies’ use of
2 terms and phrases such as “achieved in practice” and “related industry sector,” which are undefined
3 and do not have meanings generally familiar or understood in the petroleum refining industry, make
4 these HCA provisions not reasonably understandable.

5 69. The Regulations also fail to reconcile scenarios where the use of an inherent safety
6 measure for one hazard could have a negative impact on safeguards for other hazards. A refiner will
7 therefore need to make a judgment call as to which hazard is the more serious threat and which one
8 can be more effectively controlled through other means. And, in order to maximize inherent safety in
9 the aggregate, a refiner may need to select a hazard control that is lower on the hierarchy for a
10 discrete hazard in order to provide greater overall protection. The Regulations, however, do not
11 provide any guidance for balancing the need for conflicting hazard controls. The lack of guidance
12 with respect to this tension makes the Regulations not reasonably understandable.

13 70. The Board and OES described the Regulations as performance-based standards in the
14 Initial Statements of Reasons; performance-based standards are intended to allow refineries flexibility
15 in determining how to comply appropriately in particular circumstances. As written, however, the
16 requirements in the HCA provisions of the Regulations are *not* performance-based standards at all.
17 Instead, they require the HCA to make recommendations to eliminate hazards in a prescribed order of
18 priorities (e.g., first-order inherent safety measures, then second-order inherent safety measures, then
19 passive safeguards, then active safeguards, then procedural safeguards). (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8,
20 section 5189.1, subd. (l)(4)(E); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, section 2762.13, subd. (f).) The Regulations
21 then *require* refineries to adopt the HCA recommendations, with only limited exceptions. (Cal. Code
22 Regs., tit. 8, section 5189.1, subd. (x); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 19, section 2762.16, subs. (d) and (e).)

23 71. These prescriptive elements fail to effectuate the performance-based goals of the
24 enabling statutes and of the Regulations themselves, and are therefore not reasonably necessary.

25 **D. The Disparate Treatment Of Union-Designated And Non-Union Employee**
26 **Representatives In The CalPSM And CalARP Regulations Lacks “Necessity”**

27 72. The CalPSM Regulation and CalARP Regulation contain provisions requiring the
28 participation of employees and “employee representative[s]” in the design and implementation of an

1 employee participation program and in various types of process safety assessments. (Cal. Code
2 Regs., tit. 8, section 5189.1, subd. (q); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 19, section 2762.10.) For example, the
3 Regulations require refiners to ensure “effective participation by . . . employee representatives,
4 throughout all phases” of PSM and ARP (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 19, section 2762.10, subd. (a); Cal.
5 Code Regs., tit. 8, section 5189.1, subd. (q)), including the “development, training, implementation
6 and maintenance” of Process Hazard Analyses, Damage Mechanism Reviews, Hierarchy of Hazard
7 Controls Analyses, Safeguard Protection Analyses, Management of Organizational Change
8 assessments, Process Safety Culture Assessments, Incident Investigations, and Pre-Start-Up Safety
9 Reviews required by the Regulations (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, section 5189.1, subd. (q); Cal. Code
10 Regs., tit. 19, section 2762.14; *see also* Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, section 5189.1, subs. (i), (r) (making
11 clear that employers must develop process safety culture assessments and pre-start-up safety reviews
12 “*in consultation with*” employee representatives) (italics added).)

13 73. The Regulations also give union “employee representatives” a right of access to, and
14 require petroleum refiners to share, a broad range of safety-related information including compliance
15 audits, investigation reports, written procedures related to mechanical integrity, and “all documents or
16 information developed or collected by the owner or operator pursuant to” the Regulations, “including
17 information that might be subject to protection as a trade secret.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 19,
18 section 2762.10, subd. (a)(3); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, section 5189.1, subd. (q)(1)(C); *see* Cal. Code
19 Regs., tit. 19, section 2762.5, subd. (a)(2); *id.* at section 2762.8, subd. (c); *id.* at section 2762.9, subd.
20 (k); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, section 5189.1, subs. (j)(C), (u)(3), (o)(11).)

21 74. The Regulations define “employee representative” as “a union representative, where a
22 union exists, or an employee-designated representative in the absence of a union *that is on-site and*
23 *qualified for the task.*” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, section 5189.1, subd. (c); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 19,
24 section 2735.3, subd. (t), italics added.) A union representative can be from “the local union, the
25 international union, or [be] an individual designated by these parties.” (*Ibid.*)

26 75. This language requires that a non-union representative be “on-site and qualified for the
27 task,” whereas a union may designate an employee representative without regard for the individual’s
28 qualifications or employment connection to the refinery.

1 76. In their responses to comments, the Board and OES confirmed that the Regulations
2 provide for disparate treatment of non-union and union-designated representatives. The Board stated
3 in its Final Statement of Reasons that “[e]mployees are entitled to select representatives of their
4 choosing where a union exists. In the absence of a union, employee-designated representatives must
5 be on-site and qualified for the task.” OES stated in its Final Statement of Reasons that “for
6 nonunion facilities, the employee representative must be an on-site and qualified employee.
7 Employee representatives from refineries at which the employees are represented by a union can be
8 *whomever the union selects* to be their representatives.” (italics and boldface added.)

9 77. According to OES, “[t]he purpose of the employee representative is to designate a
10 clear point of contact for an employee wishing to report concerns,” regardless of whether the
11 employee representative is union or non-union. This does not provide any justification for imposing
12 requirements on non-union representatives that are not also imposed on union representatives, or for
13 allowing union-selected representatives to be unqualified or not employed at the refinery.

14 78. Neither the Board nor OES provided any evidence of the need for the disparate
15 treatment of union-designated and non-union representatives at any point during the rulemaking
16 process, despite comments that, for example, “selection of a member of the ‘international union,’
17 who might not even be a refinery employee for participation in process hazard analysis would be
18 inappropriate because such individuals would have no understanding of the specific hazards
19 associated with the process equipment at the facility.”

20 79. The Board and OES both recognize elsewhere that off-site representatives are less
21 qualified to participate in the development and implementation of PSM elements. Initially, the
22 agencies proposed employee participation language providing that “[a]uthorized collective bargaining
23 agents may select (i) *representative(s)* to participate in overall PSM program development and
24 implementation planning” (Italics added.) But the language of the final Regulations was
25 changed to authorize collective bargaining agents to select “*employees*” to participate in PSM
26 program development and implementation planning. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, section 5189.1, subd.
27 (q)(2); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 19, section 2762.10, subd. (b).) The Board and OES explained that this
28 revision was “necessary to clarify that participation in the overall PSM program development and

1 implementation planning is from employees and *not from representatives who may or may not be*
2 *employees of the refinery.*” (Italics added.) By the agencies’ own statements, they have conceded
3 that requiring a non-union employee representative to be “qualified” and “on-site” but not requiring
4 the same of a union employee representative cannot be reasonably necessary.

5 80. Additionally, allowing employee representatives who are not on-site and qualified
6 directly conflicts with the employee participation provision for pre-startup safety reviews (“PSSR”).
7 The Regulations provide that “[a]n operating employee who currently works in the unit and who has
8 expertise and experience in the process being started shall be designated as the employee
9 representative, pursuant to subsection (q).” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, section 5189.1, subd. (i)(3);
10 accord Cal. Code Regs., tit. 19, section 2762.7, subd. (c).) The requirements for employee
11 representatives participating in PSSRs therefore directly conflict with the broader employee
12 representative provision, as applied to union employee representatives, who need not have any
13 “expertise” or “experience in the [relevant] process.” In recognizing the importance of having an
14 employee representative who is on-site and qualified to participate in a PSSR, the agencies highlight
15 the arbitrariness of failing to impose this same requirement for union employee representatives
16 participating in other similar safety reviews required by the Regulations. There is no apparent safety
17 justification for this provision. Thus, it is not reasonably necessary.

18 **E. The Sweeping And Vague Regulations Impose Potentially Substantial Costs That The**
19 **Agencies Failed To Acknowledge And That Are Not Necessary Or Reasonable Under**
20 **The Circumstances.**

21 81. The Board and OES made initial determinations that the Regulations “will not have a
22 significant, statewide adverse economic impact.” However, the agencies’ assessment of economic
23 impact, performed by RAND, was deeply flawed. More broadly, the record makes clear that the
24 agencies have never acknowledged, much less made any attempt to analyze, the true potential costs
25 of the sweeping and vague Regulations.

26 82. As part of its analysis, RAND conducted a survey of California refineries that
27 included a written questionnaire and follow-up interview sessions with process safety personnel
28 regarding a preliminary draft of the CalPSM Regulation. Ten of the twelve refineries surveyed are
members of WSPA. RAND’s survey methodology and data analysis were deeply flawed and

1 therefore fatally undermine the agencies' conclusions that the Regulations "will not have a
2 significant, statewide adverse economic impact."

3 83. RAND's survey asked refiners to use their own best efforts to understand the proposed
4 rules—without providing any guidance, clarity, or instruction whatsoever as to what they would
5 actually require—such that the refiners had to hazard their own best guesses as to the meaning of the
6 proposed rules in order to try to assess the potential costs they would impose. RAND's final report
7 expressly provides: "[W]e did *not* attempt to interpret or clarify the proposed regulations." (RAND
8 Report, at p. 24, italics added.)

9 84. The absence of such guidance means that the survey results are inherently flawed. As
10 explained above, the Regulations are vague, lack clarity and context and, as a result, are susceptible
11 to multiple interpretations. Because the *inputs* of the survey were premised on the similarly vague
12 terms of the proposed rules, the *outputs* of the survey are not a reliable indicator of estimated costs.
13 They simply reflect the respondents' efforts to gauge costs of an indeterminate regulatory scheme,
14 based on differing subjective understandings and assumptions of what the Regulations actually
15 require.

16 85. Moreover, the RAND survey was based only on the proposed CalPSM Regulation—
17 and not the CalARP Regulation—released before the agencies issued their Initial Statements of
18 Reasons. Accordingly, the economic analysis did not cover all of the final regulatory requirements.
19 And because it was finished prior to the conclusion of the comment period, many of the problems
20 with the potential scope and substantive reach of the Regulations, including the inconsistencies
21 between the CalPSM and CalARP Regulations, had not yet been aired in the comment phase of the
22 rulemaking.

23 86. As a result of these fundamental flaws, nearly all survey respondents stated a below-
24 average confidence level in the cost data they provided to RAND. In fact, RAND expressly qualified
25 its analysis based on its finding that "there was significant variance in the results," which "reflect[ed]
26 legitimate differences of opinion about how the regulations would be implemented" because "one
27 could interpret the regulatory language in multiple ways." (RAND Report, at pp. xii, 7-8.) Due to
28 the confusion about the correct interpretation of the proposed rules, and the fact that the requirements

1 of the CalARP Regulation were not considered at all, the survey data—and the analysis premised on
2 that data—are incomplete and invalid.

3 87. RAND also chose to omit from its analysis relevant and statistically significant data
4 that undermine its prediction regarding the level of safety improvement the Regulations would
5 supposedly produce. For example, RAND omitted from its dataset statistics on reportable safety
6 incidents that more accurately represent process safety management performance at refineries than
7 RAND’s metrics—“Major Refinery Incidents” and refinery worker fatalities—and chose not to draw
8 data from more robust, geographically diverse samples, such as nationwide annual safety reports
9 published by the American Fuels & Petrochemical Manufacturers based on federal OSHA
10 performance results, which are inherently more comprehensive and reliable. As a result of these and
11 other errors, RAND overestimated the benefits of the Regulations.

12 88. Several commentators, including WSPA, raised these concerns with the agencies
13 during the public comment period. For example, one commentator explained: “[T]he cost estimate
14 developed by RAND for the state of California significantly underestimates the costs of the proposed
15 rule and . . . the estimated benefits are overstated.” Another commentator stated: “In summary,
16 industry has indicated large variability in implementation costs and the range and point estimates
17 calculated by RAND are likely too low. The economy wide benefits are likely overestimated, as the
18 impacts reported by RAND rely on a bad assumption.” But these comments were summarily
19 dismissed, without any explanation of or *specific support* for RAND’s survey methodology and data
20 analysis.

21 89. This record shows that the Board and OES have failed to acknowledge, much less
22 make any attempt to analyze, the true potential aggregate costs of the Regulations. The agencies
23 never grappled with the indeterminacy of the Regulations, but ignored it by leaving the survey
24 respondents to guess for themselves the meaning of the Regulations in attempting to estimate costs.
25 Nor did the Board or OES perform any independent cost-benefit analysis based on a clarifying
26 interpretation of the Regulations’ actual scope and requirements. As a result, the agencies have never
27 confronted the real-world costs and impacts of requiring a virtually perpetual safety review process.
28

1 The true potential aggregate impact of the Regulations thus remains unacknowledged and
2 unconsidered.

3 90. The agencies are not, however, entitled to adopt any regulation that they believe will
4 produce an incremental increase in safety; to the contrary, they must *avoid* “the imposition of
5 unnecessary or unreasonable regulations.” (Gov. Code section 11346.3, subd. (a); see also *id.* section
6 11342.2 [regulations must be “reasonably necessary”].) That standard includes a legitimate
7 evaluation of whether the costs imposed by the rules outweigh the benefits. (Cf. *Michigan v. EPA*
8 (2015) __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 [“Consideration of cost reflects the understanding that
9 reasonable regulation ordinarily requires paying attention to the advantages and the disadvantages of
10 agency decisions.”]) Here, the overall potential negative economic impact of the Regulations is
11 neither necessary nor reasonable under the circumstances.

12 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

13 **(Declaratory Relief Against The Occupational Safety And Health Standards Board And The** 14 **Department Of Occupational Safety And Health)**

15 91. WSPA realleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1 through 90, inclusive, of
16 this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

17 92. WSPA is an “interested person” within the meaning of Government Code section
18 11350, subdivision (a) because its members are subject to the requirements of the CalPSM
19 Regulation.

20 93. The provisions of the CalPSM Regulation described above at California Code of
21 Regulations, tit. 8, sections 5189.1, et seq., are invalid and unenforceable because they are
22 inconsistent, and in conflict, with the governing statutes, they are not reasonably necessary to
23 effectuate the purposes of the statutes, and they lack the clarity to be easily understood by the
24 petroleum refiners subject to them.

25 94. WSPA is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that the Board and DOSH
26 contend that the challenged provisions of the CalPSM Regulation are valid and enforceable.

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1 95. Therefore, an actual controversy has arisen and now exists between WSPA, on the one
2 hand, and the Board and DOSH, on the other hand, concerning whether the CalPSM Regulation is
3 valid and enforceable.

4 96. WSPA is therefore entitled to a judicial declaration pursuant to Government Code
5 section 11350 and Code of Civil Procedure section 1060 that the above-described provisions of the
6 CalPSM Regulation at California Code of Regulations, tit. 8, sections 5189.1, et seq., are invalid
7 under Government Code sections 11342.2 and 11349, subdivisions (a), (c), and (d), and
8 unenforceable.

9 **SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION**

10 **(Declaratory Relief Against The Governor’s Office Of Emergency Services)**

11 97. WSPA realleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1 through 90, inclusive, of
12 this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

13 98. WSPA is an “interested person” within the meaning of Government Code section
14 11350, subdivision (a) because its members are subject to the requirements of the CalARP
15 Regulation.

16 99. The provisions of the CalARP Regulation described above at California Code of
17 Regulations, tit. 19, sections 2735.1, et seq. are invalid and unenforceable because they are
18 inconsistent, and in conflict, with the governing statutes, they are not reasonably necessary to
19 effectuate the purposes of the statutes, and they lack the clarity to be easily understood by the
20 petroleum refiners subject to them.

21 100. WSPA is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that OES contends that the
22 challenged provisions of the CalARP Regulation are valid and enforceable.

23 101. Therefore, an actual controversy has arisen and now exists between WSPA and OES
24 concerning whether the CalARP Regulation is valid and enforceable.

25 102. WSPA is therefore entitled to a judicial declaration pursuant to Government Code
26 section 11350 and Code of Civil Procedure section 1060 that the above-described provisions of the
27 CalARP Regulation at California Code of Regulations, tit. 19, sections 2735.1, et seq. is invalid
28

1 under Government Code sections 11342.2 and 11349, subdivisions (a), (c), and (d), and
2 unenforceable.

3 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

4 WHEREFORE, WSPA prays that:

5 1. A judicial declaration be issued that the above-described provisions of the CalPSM
6 Regulation at California Code of Regulations, tit. 8, sections 5189.1, et seq., are invalid and
7 unenforceable;

8 2. A permanent injunction be issued, enjoining enforcement of the above-described
9 provisions of the CalPSM Regulation at California Code of Regulations, tit. 8, sections 5189.1, et
10 seq.;

11 3. A judicial declaration be issued that the above-described provisions of the CalARP
12 Regulation at California Code of Regulations, tit. 19, sections 2735.1, et seq., are invalid and
13 unenforceable;

14 4. A permanent injunction be issued, enjoining enforcement of the above-described
15 provisions of the CalARP Regulation at California Code of Regulations, tit. 19, sections 2735.1, et
16 seq.;

17 5. WSPA recover its costs in this action, including any attorneys' fees authorized by law;
18 and

19 6. Such other or further relief be granted that the Court deems proper.
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1 DATED: July 9, 2019

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Attachment

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14 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
15 **EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

16 WESTERN STATES PETROLEUM
17 ASSOCIATION, a California not-for-profit
corporation,

18 Plaintiff,

19 v.

20 THE CALIFORNIA OCCUPATIONAL
21 HEALTH AND SAFETY STANDARDS
BOARD, together with its members, DAVID
22 THOMAS, CHRIS LASZCZ-DAVIS,
23 LAURA STOCK, BARBARA BURGEL,
DAVID HARRISON, and NOLA J.
24 KENNEDY, in their official capacities, and
THE CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S OFFICE
25 OF EMERGENCY SERVICES, together with
its Director, MARK GHILARDUCCI, in his
26 official capacity.

27 Defendants.
28

CASE NO. -

**COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY
AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF**

1 Plaintiff Western States Petroleum Association (“WSPA”) alleges, by and through its
2 attorneys, as follows:

3 **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**

4 1. On behalf of its members, WSPA seeks a court order declaring invalid and enjoining
5 the enforcement of certain California state regulations that impermissibly and unconstitutionally
6 interfere with the “comprehensive regulation of industrial relations by Congress” through the
7 National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). *San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen’s Union, Local*
8 *2020 v. Garmon*, 359 U.S. 236, 239 (1959).

9 2. This framework for the regulation of labor-management relations, enacted in 1935, is
10 “an integral part of our economic life.” *Garmon*, 359 U.S. at 239. Under the NLRA, “Congress has
11 entrusted administration of the labor policy for the Nation to a centralized administrative agency,
12 armed with its own procedures, and equipped with its specialized knowledge and cumulative
13 experience.” *Id.* at 242. That agency is the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”).

14 3. The preemptive scope of the NLRA is vast. State regulations are preempted not only
15 when they directly conflict with the NLRA, but also when the state regulates matters that are
16 “arguably within the compass” of the NLRA—that is, when the state regulations involve conduct that
17 is “arguably” protected or prohibited by the NLRA. *Garmon*, 359 U.S. at 246. Regulations are also
18 preempted if they address conduct that “Congress intended . . . be *unregulated* [and] left to be
19 controlled by the free play of economic forces.” *Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace*
20 *Workers, AFL-CIO v. Wis. Employment Relats. Comm’n (“Machinists”)*, 427 U.S. 132, 140 (1976)
21 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added).

22 4. The California Process Safety Management (“CalPSM”) Regulations and California
23 Accidental Release Program (“CalARP”) Regulations (together, the “Regulations”) promulgated by
24 the Defendants in 2017 purport to regulate directly the relationship, rights, and responsibilities of
25 unions and employers. Specifically, the Regulations grant unions increased leverage and authority
26 with respect to a matter that is already a mandatory subject of collective bargaining under the
27 NLRA—workplace safety. Among other things, the Regulations explicitly confer authority on
28 unions to designate “employee representatives” who are entitled to demand and receive safety

1 information and to participate extensively in process safety management (“PSM”) and accidental
2 release program (“ARP”) activities at petroleum refineries. In this and other respects, the
3 Regulations directly regulate unions’ role and rights in the workplace, as well as employers’
4 obligations toward these union-appointed “employee representatives.” In so doing, the Regulations
5 grant unions new and unbargained-for authority over employers’ safety processes and safety-related
6 expenditures. For example, the Regulations allow union representatives to determine which
7 employees will participate in various safety reviews, and to participate themselves in the refinery’s
8 safety programs, including development of specific safety recommendations. This newly granted
9 authority has widespread and important effects, including giving unions leverage to seek unrelated
10 concessions in collective bargaining.

11 5. These matters—including employees’ ability to select their “representative,” and
12 employers’ obligations to recognize and deal with “employee representatives”—are already regulated
13 by federal labor law and are already specifically addressed in collective bargaining agreements
14 between petroleum refiners and unions. The Regulations therefore constitute a direct and unlawful
15 intervention by the state in federally supervised labor-management relations.

16 6. To make matters worse, the Regulations also inexplicably and impermissibly afford
17 preferential treatment to unions in designating employee representatives. They provide for
18 participation in safety reviews at particular refineries by *unqualified* union-designated representatives
19 who lack any employment connection to the refinery, while requiring non-union employee
20 representatives to be qualified and located on-site. According to the Regulations, the employee
21 representatives at non-unionized workplaces must be “on-site and qualified for the task,” whereas
22 union employee representatives can be virtually any “representative” chosen by the union, regardless
23 of whether the representative is “on-site and qualified for the task.” 8 Cal. Code Regs. § 5189.1(e).

24 7. Even without the Regulations, unions and their designated representatives may, of
25 course, participate in safety-process and review functions. But as a matter of federal law, the
26 parameters of their rights and employers’ reciprocal obligations are to be determined by the NLRA
27 and through collective bargaining and the “free play of economic forces,” *not* by states or state
28 agencies. Accordingly, the Regulations are squarely preempted by the NLRA.

1 8. Absent a declaration that the Regulations are preempted and a permanent injunction
2 against their enforcement, WSPA’s members are placed in an increasingly untenable position:
3 comply with preempted regulations in violation of their federally protected rights or face significant
4 liability for noncompliance. The requested relief is necessary and warranted to redress a clear and
5 ongoing violation of WSPA’s members’ rights.

6 **THE PARTIES**

7 9. Plaintiff WSPA is a California not-for-profit corporation and a long-standing trade
8 association of energy companies that own and operate properties and facilities in the petroleum
9 industry—including petroleum refineries—within the Western states (Arizona, Nevada, California,
10 Oregon, and Washington). It is the oldest petroleum trade association in the United States. WSPA’s
11 principal offices are located at 1415 L Street, Suite 600, Sacramento, California. WSPA’s members
12 operate petroleum refineries in Contra Costa County, Los Angeles County, San Luis Obispo County,
13 and Solano County, and are covered by the Regulations. WSPA members own and operate most of
14 the petroleum refineries in California.

15 10. Labor relations of WSPA’s members (whether unionized or non-unionized) are
16 governed by the NLRA. The NLRA governs both unionized and non-unionized employers because it
17 sets forth procedures for employees to select their representatives, establishes obligations that
18 employers bear toward those representatives, and prohibits certain unlawful labor practices at all
19 workplaces. WSPA and its members have an interest in ensuring that state regulations do not
20 interfere with the carefully crafted labor relations system created by the NLRA and enforced by the
21 NLRB.

22 11. Defendants David Thomas, Chris Laszcz-Davis, Laura Stock, Barbara Burgel, David
23 Harrison, and Nola J. Kennedy are all members of the California Occupational Safety and Health
24 Standards Board (the “Board”), also a named Defendant in this action. These individuals are
25 appointed by the Governor and charged with setting standards for the California Division of
26 Occupational Safety and Health. These individuals or their predecessors and the Board promulgated
27 the CalPSM regulations challenged herein. The Board and its members have their principal offices at
28 2520 Venture Oaks Way, Suite 350, Sacramento, California.

1 12. Defendant Mark Ghilarducci is the Director of the California Governor's Office of
2 Emergency Services ("OES"), a cabinet-level state public agency within the Office of the Governor
3 of California and a named Defendant in this action. Defendants Ghilarducci and OES are charged
4 with assuring the state's readiness to respond to and recover from all hazards and are responsible for
5 overall state agency response to disasters. Defendants Ghilarducci and OES promulgated the
6 CalARP regulations challenged herein. Defendants Ghilarducci and OES have their principal offices
7 at 2650 Schriever Avenue, Mather, California, and 10390 Peter A. McCuen Boulevard, Mather,
8 California, respectively.

9 **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

10 13. This Court has jurisdiction of this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because the case
11 arises under (i) the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution of the United States, Article VI, clause 2;
12 and (ii) the laws of the United States, including the NLRA and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This Court also has
13 jurisdiction of this action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 because this is an actual controversy in
14 which Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment.

15 14. Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), because Defendants are
16 residents of, are found within, have agents within, or transact their affairs in this district, and a
17 substantial part of the activities giving rise to this action—that is, the promulgation of the
18 unconstitutional Regulations—occurred in this district.

19 15. WSPA has associational standing to bring this suit on behalf of its members because
20 more than one of those members will be directly, adversely, and imminently affected by the
21 Regulations and thus would have standing to sue in their own right.* If the Regulations are not
22 enjoined, WSPA's members face the "immediate or threatened injury" of enforcement actions. *Hunt*
23 *v. Wash. State Apple Advertising Comm'n*, 432 U.S. 333, 342 (1977). Furthermore, the interests that
24 WSPA seeks to protect by way of this lawsuit are germane to the organization's purpose.
25 Specifically, WSPA is dedicated to addressing the wide range of public policy issues that affect the
26 petroleum industry, including state regulations such as CalARP and CalPSM that impose

27
28 * A list of WSPA's current members is available on its website: <https://www.wspa.org/about/> (last visited July 8, 2019).

1 unreasonable and unlawful mandates on WSPA members. Finally, neither the claims asserted nor the
2 relief requested requires an individual member of WSPA to participate in this suit.

3 **THE FACTS**

4 **A. Background**

5 16. As amended in 1990, Section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. § 7412) directed
6 the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and the federal Occupational Safety and
7 Health Administration (“OSHA”) to develop regulations to prevent accidental chemical releases. In
8 response, the EPA and OSHA each adopted accident prevention plans to gather information on
9 chemical accidents and to encourage industry members to improve process safety. The plan led by
10 OSHA became known as Process Safety Management, and the plan led by the EPA became known as
11 the Risk Management Plan.

12 17. Pursuant to its congressional mandate, OSHA published a Final Rule for Process
13 Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals on February 24, 1992. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.119.
14 This rule applies to processes involving chemicals, flammable gases, or flammable liquids above
15 certain threshold quantities.

16 18. In 1996, the EPA promulgated a final rule for accident prevention under the Risk
17 Management Plan. 40 C.F.R. § 68.1 *et seq.* This rule requires owners or operators of facilities with
18 more than a threshold quantity of a regulated substance to develop an accident prevention program.

19 19. Meanwhile, at the state level, the California State Legislature passed a law in 1986
20 calling for the development of an accident prevention plan, which would become known as the
21 CalARP program. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25531 *et seq.* The CalARP program tracks the
22 requirements of Section 112(r) of the federal Clean Air Act and also includes other state-specific
23 requirements. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25533. Among other things, this legislation required
24 OES to adopt regulations for the CalARP program. OES promulgated its original CalARP
25 regulations in 1997. 19 Cal. Code Regs. § 2735.3.

26 20. In 1990—the same year Congress amended the Clean Air Act—the California State
27 Legislature enacted legislation calling for the Board to implement state PSM standards (Cal. Lab.
28

1 Code § 7855 *et seq.*) to “prevent or minimize the consequences of catastrophic releases of toxic,
2 flammable, or explosive chemicals.”

3 21. In 1992, the Board adopted state PSM standards, codified at 8 Cal. Code Regs. § 5189.
4 These standards apply to more than 1,900 facilities in the state, including petroleum refineries.

5 22. In 2012, the Governor’s Interagency Working Group on Refinery Safety (the
6 “Working Group”) issued a report concerning the safety of petroleum refineries in California. The
7 Working Group’s report recommended the establishment of an Interagency Refinery Task Force to,
8 among other things, coordinate refinery-specific revisions to the state’s PSM regulations and the
9 CalARP regulations.

10 23. In 2013, the California State Legislature passed legislation mandating that the Board
11 adopt PSM standards for refineries. Cal. Lab. Code § 7856.

12 24. Invoking that requirement, the Board promulgated a new PSM regulatory scheme
13 applicable to petroleum refineries in July 2017—the CalPSM Regulation. 8 Cal. Code Regs.
14 § 5189.1. A “general” violation of the CalPSM Regulation carries a \$13,047 per-violation penalty (8
15 Cal. Code Regs. § 336(b)), and a “serious” violation of the CalPSM Regulation carries an \$18,000 to
16 \$25,000 per-violation penalty (*id.* at § 336(c)). The penalty for a “willful” violation is multiplied by
17 five, up to \$130,464 per violation, and repeat violations are likewise subject to a scale of multipliers
18 (i.e., two times for the first repeat; four times for the second repeat; ten times for the third repeat, up
19 to \$130,464 per violation). *Id.* at §§ 336(g) and (h). Failure to abate a violation can result in a daily
20 penalty of up to \$15,000. *Id.* at § 336(f).

21 25. Also in 2017, OES promulgated a new CalARP regulatory scheme applicable to
22 petroleum refineries in California—the CalARP Regulation. 19 Cal. Code Regs. § 2735.1 *et seq.* A
23 “general” violation of the CalARP Regulation results in a civil penalty of up to \$2,000 per day plus
24 the cost of any associated emergencies or remediation. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25540(a)(1). A
25 “knowing” violation of the CalARP Regulation results in a civil penalty of up to \$25,000 per day
26 (plus associated emergency or remediation costs), as well as misdemeanor criminal liability. *Id.* at
27 §§ 25540(a)(4), 25540.1.

28

1 **B. The CalARP and CalPSM Regulations**

2 26. The CalPSM Regulation and the CalARP Regulation are substantively similar, and,
3 according to the Board and OES, are designed to function in tandem.

4 27. The Board issued its notice of proposed rulemaking and Initial Statement of Reasons
5 for the CalPSM Regulation on July 15, 2016, setting the public comment period from July 15, 2016
6 to September 15, 2016, and a public hearing date of September 15, 2016. During the comment period
7 commenters expressed a number of concerns with the proposed regulation’s employee-representation
8 requirements, including that—in the words of one commenter—the proposed regulation “would be at
9 odds [with] the policy underlying the National Labor Relations Act, which is to maintain equality of
10 bargaining power between employers and employees and to avoid burdening or obstructing
11 commerce through concerted activities which impair the interest of the public in the free flow of such
12 commerce.” On February 10, 2017, the Board issued a notice of proposed modifications and set a
13 March 3, 2017, deadline for comments on the modifications to the proposed regulation. Thereafter,
14 the Board issued a Final Statement of Reasons, failing to address adequately the public comments,
15 including those submitted by WSPA. Nevertheless, the CalPSM Regulation was approved by the
16 Office of Administrative Law and filed with the Secretary of State on July 27, 2017. The CalPSM
17 Regulation became effective on October 1, 2017.

18 28. OES issued its notice of proposed rulemaking and Initial Statement of Reasons for the
19 CalARP Regulation on July 15, 2016, setting the public comment period from July 15, 2016 to
20 September 15, 2016, and a public hearing date of August 31, 2016. In response, commenters again
21 raised a number of concerns about the proposed regulation’s employee-representation requirements,
22 including the inconsistencies between the proposed regulations and the NLRA. On February 14,
23 2017, OES issued a notice of modification of text of proposed regulations and set a March 3, 2017
24 deadline for comments on the modifications to the proposed regulation. Thereafter, OES issued a
25 Final Statement of Reasons, which failed to adequately address the public comments, including those
26 submitted by WSPA. Regardless, the CalARP Regulation was approved by the Office of
27 Administrative Law and filed with the Secretary of State on August 18, 2017. The CalARP
28 Regulation became effective on October 1, 2017.

1 29. Both Regulations require the participation of an “employee representative” in all
2 elements of PSM and ARP. Each Regulation defines “employee representative” as “a union
3 representative, where a union exists, or an employee-designated representative in the absence of a
4 union *that is on-site and qualified for the task.*” 8 Cal. Code Regs. § 5189.1(c) (emphasis added);
5 *accord* 19 Cal. Code Regs. § 2735.3(t). A union representative can be from “the local union, the
6 international union, or [be an] employee designated by these parties” 8 Cal. Code Regs.
7 § 5189.1(c); *accord* 19 Cal. Code Regs. § 2735.3(t). Thus, in unionized workplaces, the employee
8 representative must be a union representative, designated by the union. And the union may designate
9 an employee representative to participate in CalARP and CalPSM without regard to the individual’s
10 qualifications or employment connection to the refinery.

11 30. The Board and OES have admitted that the Regulations provide different standards for
12 union-designated representatives than for non-union representatives. The Board stated in its Final
13 Statement of Reasons that “[e]mployees are entitled to select representatives of their choosing where
14 a union exists. In the absence of a union, employee-designated representatives must be onsite and
15 qualified for the task.” Similarly, OES stated in its Final Statement of Reasons that “for nonunion
16 facilities, the employee representative must be an on-site and qualified employee. Employee
17 representatives from refineries at which the employees are represented by a union can be *whomever*
18 *the union selects to be their representatives.*” (Emphasis added.)

19 31. In addition to improperly attempting to regulate employees’ and unions’ selection of
20 “employee representatives” for purposes of interacting with their employer, the Regulations give
21 these employee representatives far-reaching rights and responsibilities for PSM and ARP processes,
22 directly interfering with “the relations between employees, their union, and their employer.” *Sears,*
23 *Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Cnty. Dist. Council of Carpenters*, 436 U.S. 180, 193 (1978).

24 32. Specifically, the Regulations give union “employee representatives” a right of access
25 to, and require petroleum refiners to share, a broad range of safety-related information, including
26 compliance audits, investigation reports, written procedures related to mechanical integrity, and “all
27 documents or information developed or collected by the owner or operator pursuant to” the
28 Regulations, “including information that might be subject to protection as a trade secret.” 19 Cal.

1 Code Regs. § 2762.10(a)(3); 8 Cal. Code Regs. § 5189.1(q)(1)(C); *see also* 19 Cal. Code Regs.
2 §§ 2762.5(a)(2), 2762.8(c), and 2762.9(k); 8 Cal. Code Regs. § 5189.1(j)(1)(C), (u)(3), (o)(11).

3 33. The Regulations also vest “employee representatives”—and accordingly, union
4 officials—with a broad right to participate in developing and implementing the programs mandated
5 by the Regulations. *See* 19 Cal. Code Regs. § 2762.10(b); 8 Cal. Code Regs. § 5189.1(q).
6 Employers are required to ensure “effective participation by . . . employee representatives,
7 *throughout all phases*” of PSM and ARP, 19 Cal. Code Regs. § 2762.10(a) (emphasis added); *see* 8
8 Cal. Code Regs. § 5189.1(q), including the “development, training, implementation and
9 maintenance” of Process Hazard Analyses, Damage Mechanism Reviews, Hierarchy of Hazard
10 Controls Analyses, Safeguard Protection Analyses, Management of Organizational Change
11 assessments, Process Safety Culture Assessments, Incident Investigations, and Pre-Start-Up Safety
12 Reviews required by the Regulations, 8 Cal. Code Regs. § 5189.1(q)(2); *see also* 19 Cal. Code Regs.
13 § 2762.14(e); 8 Cal. Code Regs. §§ 5189.1(i) and (r) (specifying that employers must develop
14 process-safety-culture assessments and pre-start-up safety reviews “*in consultation with*” employee
15 representatives) (emphasis added).

16 34. The Regulations also require that petroleum refineries develop and implement a plan
17 for “stop work procedures” and again do so “*in consultation with employees*” and the “employee
18 representatives.” 19 Cal. Code Regs. § 2762.16(f); 8 Cal. Code Regs. § 5189.1(q)(5) (emphasis
19 added).

20 35. The Regulations further confer upon “employee representatives”—including union-
21 designated representatives—the right to demand additional, tailored information from employers
22 beyond the information that the Regulations require employers to share. For example, employee
23 representatives have the right to provide “comments on the written audit report[s],” and employers
24 are *required* to “respond in writing within 60 calendar days.” 19 Cal. Code Regs. § 2762.8(c); 8 Cal.
25 Code Regs. § 5189.1(u)(3). The Regulations also provide employee representatives with the right to
26 submit “written hazard reports”—which can be submitted anonymously—and require owners and
27 operators to respond in “writing within 30 calendar days.” 19 Cal. Code Regs. § 2762.16(f)(2); 8
28 Cal. Code Regs. § 5189.1(q)(5)(B).

1 36. Unions are not limited to selecting a single representative who would be entitled to
2 participate in ARP and PSM activities. Rather, “an authorized collective bargaining agent may select
3 employee(s) to participate in overall Accidental Release Prevention program development and
4 implementation planning and for employee(s) to participate in each team-based activity pursuant to
5 this Article.” 19 Cal. Code Regs. § 2762.10(b); *see* 8 Cal. Code Regs. § 5189.1(q)(2) (“Authorized
6 collective bargaining agents may select (A) employee(s) to participate in overall PSM program
7 development and implementation planning and (B) employee(s) to participate in PSM teams and
8 other activities, pursuant to this section.”). By contrast, in non-unionized workplaces, employers are
9 simply required to “establish effective procedures in consultation with employees for the selection of
10 employee representatives.” 19 Cal. Code Regs. § 2762.10(c); 8 Cal. Code Regs. § 5189.1(q)(3).
11 Unions’ authority under the Regulations to select multiple “representatives” to participate in ARP and
12 PSM further increases unions’ power and leverage with respect to unionized employers.

13 37. And, as reflected in paragraphs 24 and 25 above, refineries face significant potential
14 penalties if they fail to comply.

15 **C. Conflict with the NLRA**

16 38. The employee-participation provisions of the CalARP and CalPSM Regulations
17 directly regulate and interfere with labor-management relations, which are the exclusive province of
18 federal law.

19 39. In 1935, Congress enacted the NLRA in order “to protect the rights of employees and
20 employers, to encourage collective bargaining, and to curtail certain private sector labor and
21 management practices, which can harm the general welfare of workers, businesses and the U.S.
22 economy.” National Labor Relations Board, *National Labor Relations Act*,
23 <https://www.nlr.gov/resources/national-labor-relations-act> (last visited July 8, 2019). The NLRA
24 sets forth a comprehensive framework for the conduct and regulation of labor relations, including the
25 selection of representatives, a set of rights and obligations with respect to those representatives, and
26 processes for collective bargaining and the resolution of labor disputes.

27 40. As relevant here, the NLRA authorizes employees to select “representatives of their
28 own choosing” who will “bargain collectively” on their behalf. 29 U.S.C. § 157. Representatives

1 selected using the NLRB’s established election procedures become “the exclusive representatives of
2 all the employees in [the election] unit for the purposes of collective bargaining.” *Id.* at § 159(a).
3 The NLRA imposes a “mutual obligation o[n] the employer and the representative of the employees”
4 to bargain “in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
5 employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). These terms and conditions include “safety on the job,” which “is
6 a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.” *Pierce v. Commonwealth Edison Co.*, 112 F.3d 893,
7 896 (7th Cir. 1997).

8 41. ““When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a State purports to
9 regulate are protected by § 7 of the [NLRA], or constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8, due
10 regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield,”” and the conflicting state
11 regulation must be preempted. *Idaho Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, AFL-CIO v. Inland Pac.*
12 *Chapter of Assoc. Builders & Contractors, Inc.*, 801 F.3d 950, 956–57 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting
13 *Garmon*, 359 U.S. at 244).

14 42. In violation of the NLRA, the Regulations purport to (a) govern how employees—
15 through their union—select “representatives” to the employer for purposes of addressing a mandatory
16 subject of bargaining; (b) give those “employee representatives” new and greater rights, and impose
17 upon employers reciprocal obligations that touch upon and conflict with those established by federal
18 law and achieved through collective bargaining pursuant to the free play of economic forces; and
19 (c) threaten employers with penalties that far exceed those established by federal law in
20 circumstances where employers fail to submit to these newly minted “employee representatives” and
21 their *ultra vires* state-law labor rights. In all of these respects, and as explained above, the
22 Regulations constitute a direct and unlawful intervention by the state in federally supervised labor-
23 management relations.

24 43. The Regulations directly regulate labor-management relations and impermissibly give
25 unions rights, power, and leverage not provided by the NLRA. Unions, in turn, are improperly
26 empowered to make use of this leverage in entirely unrelated bargaining discussions with employers.
27 And, by mandating that employers provide specific safety information to union representatives, the
28 Regulations also impermissibly control conduct that is already controlled, or arguably controlled and

1 protected, by the NLRA. *See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Local Union No. 6-418, AFL-CIO v.*
2 *N.L.R.B.*, 711 F.2d 348, 360–61 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (unfair labor practice to deny union request for
3 safety information when the requested information is “reasonably necessary to enable” the union
4 “effectively to administer and police collective bargaining agreements or intelligently to seek their
5 modification”).

6 44. Employees may, of course, designate representatives for purposes of discussing,
7 addressing, and improving workplace safety and safety processes. But this designation, and the
8 representatives’ reciprocal rights and responsibilities, are properly determined by the NLRA and
9 through federally regulated collective bargaining between unions and employers, not by state fiat.
10 The Regulations are therefore preempted by the NLRA.

11 **D. Injury from the Regulations**

12 45. All WSPA members operating petroleum refineries in California must currently
13 comply with the Regulations, which took effect on October 1, 2017. Failure to comply with the
14 Regulations could result in significant penalties, while complying with the Regulations significantly
15 alters the playing field of labor relations and violates WSPA members’ federal rights.

16 46. WSPA’s members are and have been subject to enforcement and threatened
17 enforcement of the Regulations, including WSPA members that have been issued citations under the
18 employee-participation provisions of the Regulations based on conduct in areas subject to collective
19 bargaining.

20 47. The Regulations also present WSPA’s members with an ongoing “Hobson’s choice”
21 of complying with the preempted Regulations in violation of their rights or suffering the threat of
22 significant penalties. *See, e.g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.*, 504 U.S. 374, 381 (1992)
23 (“irreparable injury” existed where states “made clear that they would seek to enforce” law and
24 plaintiffs faced “Hobson’s choice” of “expos[ing] themselves to potentially huge liability” or
25 “suffer[ing] the injury of obeying” law); *Am.’s Health Ins. Plans v. Hudgens*, 742 F.3d 1319, 1334
26 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[a]bsent an injunction, [plaintiffs] will be forced either to incur the costs of
27 compliance with a preempted state law or face the possibility of penalties”). WSPA’s members have
28

1 no adequate remedy at law for these harms that they have suffered and will continue to suffer, and
2 therefore injunctive relief is appropriate.

3 **COUNT I**

4 **Violation of the Supremacy Clause (Preemption)**

5 48. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 47 of this Complaint as though
6 fully set forth herein.

7 49. When a state or local law stands as an obstacle to the objectives of a federal law or
8 intrudes on a field that Congress reserved for the federal government, the Supremacy Clause of the
9 Constitution of the United States preempts that state or local law.

10 50. The Regulations are preempted because they intrude on areas that are encompassed by
11 the NLRA. These Regulations are particularly egregious because they directly regulate the
12 relationship between employers and unions—including the appointment and authority of “employee
13 representatives” and employers’ obligations to those representatives—and give unions rights to which
14 they would not otherwise be entitled under federal law. NLRA preemption “has its greatest force
15 when applied to state laws regulating,” as here, “the relations between employees, their union, and
16 their employer.” *Sears, Roebuck & Co.*, 436 U.S. at 193.

17 51. In addition, the NLRA preempts the Regulations because they address conduct—
18 employers’ provision of or failure to provide safety-related information to union representatives, and
19 employers’ consultation or failure to consult with the union about safety—that is “arguably”
20 protected or prohibited by the NLRA. *Garmon*, 359 U.S. at 246.

21 52. By mandating certain forms of employee representation and involvement in employer
22 activities—forms which the NLRA does *not* mandate—the Regulations also encroach on an area that
23 “Congress intended . . . be unregulated [and] ‘left to be controlled by the free play of economic
24 forces.’” *Machinists*, 427 U.S. at 140. Accordingly, Defendants may not lawfully enforce the
25 Regulations.

COUNT II

42 U.S.C. § 1983

1
2
3 53. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 52 of this Complaint as though
4 fully set forth herein.

5 54. Section 1983 of Title 42 of the U.S. Code provides in relevant part that anyone “who,
6 under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory . . .
7 subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
8 jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the
9 Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the injured party in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
10 proper proceeding for redress.”

11 55. The NLRA establishes both employees’ and employers’ rights to engage in collective
12 bargaining with respect to employee representation and employers’ safety processes. Where the
13 particular forms of employee representation on these issues are not established by the NLRA, they
14 are to be left to the “free play of economic forces,” *Machinists*, 427 U.S. at 140, and employers thus
15 have a protected liberty interest in being free from regulations that mandate the forms of such
16 representation.

17 56. Acting under color of California law, Defendants have deprived WSPA and its
18 members of their federal rights under the NLRA to be free from “governmental interference with the
19 collective-bargaining process,” *Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles*, 493 U.S. 103, 109
20 (1989), by promulgating the Regulations.

21 57. Accordingly, Defendants are liable under Section 1983, and therefore subject to
22 attorney’s fees under Section 1988 of Title 42 of the U.S. Code.

23 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

24 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, on behalf of its members, prays that this Court:

25 1. Issue a declaratory judgment that the Regulations are invalid and unenforceable as a
26 matter of federal law to the extent that they require the involvement of, or otherwise grant rights or
27 authority to, unions or their representatives—including without limitation the specific provisions
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1 discussed above—because such requirements are preempted by the Constitution and laws of the
2 United States;

3 2. Issue a permanent injunction:

4 A. Restraining and enjoining the Defendants, their agents and employees, and all
5 persons acting in concert or participation with them, from, in any manner or by any means,
6 enforcing or seeking to enforce the provisions of the Regulations that require petroleum
7 refiners to involve, or otherwise grant rights or authority to, unions or their representatives;

8 B. Requiring the Defendants to issue such notices, and take such steps as shall be
9 necessary and appropriate to carry into effect the substance and intent of paragraph A above,
10 including, but not limited to, the requirement that Defendants publicly withdraw and rescind
11 any directions, requests, or suggestions to any company subject to the Regulations, that are
12 inconsistent with judgment in this case;

13 3. Declare that Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by promulgating the Regulations
14 and threatening their enforcement, and award Plaintiff the legal and equitable relief authorized by that
15 statute, as well as a reasonable attorney’s fee pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b); and

16 4. Grant Plaintiff such additional relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
17

18 DATED: July 9, 2019

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23 By: /s/ Peter S. Modlin
Peter S. Modlin

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